The prisoner's dilemma has become the leading paradigm to explain the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. Here, we present an adaptive strategy that implements new mechanisms to process information about past encounters. The history of moves is summarized in an internal state which then determines the subsequent move. This enables the strategy to adjust its decisions to the character of the current opponent and to adapt the most promising strategic behavior. For this reason, we call such strategies Adaptor. Through evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that the concept of Adaptor leads to strategical patterns that are (a) highly cooperative when playing against kin, (b) stable in a sense that goes far beyond the concept of evolutionary stability, (c) robust to environmental changes, i.e. variations of the parameter values and finally (d) superior in performance to the most prominent strategies in the literature. r
Introduction
The evolution of cooperation and altruistic behavior among unrelated selfish individuals is one of the most fundamental questions in disciplines as diverse as biology and economics (Colman, 1995; Dugatkin, 1997; Kagel & Roth, 1995) . Tremendous scientific effort has been dedicated to theoretical and experimental investigations to understand the superiority of mutually beneficial interactions despite their obvious vulnerability to exploitation through defective individuals. Across disciplines, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981 ) became a widely accepted mathematical framework to study cooperative behavior.
In the PD; individuals engage in pairwise interactions with two behavioral options. They must simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Their joint behavior then determines their payoffs. A cooperative act involves a cost c to the donor and provides a benefit b to the recipient. For obvious reasons b4c must hold. Thus, mutual cooperation pays a reward R ¼ b À c; while mutual defection results in a punishment P ¼ 0: If one player opts for D and the other for C; the former obtains the temptation to defect T ¼ b and the latter is left with the sucker's payoff S ¼ Àc: Hence, defectors are always better off regardless of their opponents decision. Consequentially, ''rational'' individuals, i.e. players attempting to maximize their short-term profits, always end up with the punishment P instead of the higher reward R for cooperation. The general definition of the PD requires the following rank ordering of the payoff values:
Note that the notation involving costs c and benefits b always satisfies this ordering. In the following, we generally stick to this simpler notation with only two parameters. In recent years, several scenarios have been proposed and experimentally verified to overcome this dilemma and to allow for cooperative behavior to emerge even among unrelated individuals. All of them are based on simple discrimination mechanisms that enable cooperative individuals to target their altruistic acts towards certain other individuals only. These mechanisms can be divided into three scenarios: (a) direct reciprocity, (b) indirect reciprocity and (c) spatial extension. In (a) the same individuals interact repeatedly. This enables them to trigger their behavior on the outcome of previous rounds and therefore to cooperate only with cooperative opponents (see below). In the case of indirect reciprocity (b), individuals interact only in one direction, i.e. there is no chance to reciprocate and return a service. Recent models (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) suggest that individuals carry some sort of reputation that essentially summarizes their past actions. This enables cooperative individuals to direct altruistic acts selectively towards helpful individuals by following the experimentally verified rule help and you shall be helped (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000) . Finally, in spatially extended systems (c) individuals interact once in a local neighborhood. This enables cooperators to prosper by forming clusters and thereby minimizing interactions with defective individuals (Hauert, 2001 (Hauert, , 2002 Herz, 1994; Killingback et al., 1999; Lindgren & Nordahl, 1994; Nowak & May, 1992 ).
DIRECT RECIPROCITY
The concept of direct reciprocity was summarized in a famous review by Trivers (1971) and has become very popular through game theoretical computer tournaments organized by Axelrod (1984) . In these tournaments, submitted strategies competed in the repeated or iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD). The IPD imposes a second constraint on the payoff values R; S; T; P:
This ensures that mutual cooperation pays the highest reward to the community. In particular, this prohibits that periodic alternations of C and D moves lead to more favorable outcomes. The notation with c and b always satisfies condition (2). Axelrod's tournaments were won by a surprisingly simple strategy called Tit-for-Tat (TFT). This strategy cooperates in the first round and from then on imitates the opponents move of the previous round. Thus, TFT cooperates against kin, but retaliates against defectors. The weak side of TFT becomes apparent in noisy environments where erroneous moves occur. In longlasting interactions, this reduces the payoff of TFT against itself to that of a random strategy which cooperates or defects by tossing a coin. This serious drawback of TFT was resolved by another simple strategy called Pavlov (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993) . It follows the concept of winstay, lose-shift: a payoff of R or T is considered as a win and Pavlov sticks to its decision, but switches whenever it gets S or P points. This simple rule enables Pavlov to readily correct errors when playing against kin and to return to cooperation.
Other prominent strategies include the always cooperate and always defect strategies all C and all D; Grim (Binmore & Samuelson, 1992) , generous TFT (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992) and Firm-but-Fair (FbF ) (Frean, 1994; Nowak & Sigmund, 1994) . All these theoretical investigations were complemented by many biological field observations as well as experiments on human and animal behavior (Dugatkin, 1997; Milinski, 1987; Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Packer, 1977; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996; Wilkinson, 1984) .
The basic mechanism that promotes cooperation in repeated interactions is summarized by a quote of Axelrod stating that the shadow of the C. HAUERT AND O. STENULL future, i.e. the fear from retaliation, motivates individuals to cooperate in the present.
MEMORY ONE STRATEGIES AND BEYOND
All strategies introduced so far belong to the class of memory one strategies. This means that the conditional probabilities to cooperate require the memory of one round. The strategic behavior is encoded by a quadruple of parameters ð p R ; p S ; p T ; p P Þ denoting the probabilities to cooperate after receiving R; S; T or P points, respectively. For example, TFT corresponds to ð1; 0; 1; 0Þ; Pavlov to ð1; 0; 0; 1Þ; Grim to ð1; 0; 0; 0Þ; FbF to ð1; 0; 1; 2=3Þ; etc. If erroneous moves occur with a small probability p err the following changes apply: 1-1 À p err and 0-p err :
Interestingly, generalizing the concept of memory one strategies to include longer memory sizes did not reveal substantially new strategical patterns (Hauert & Schuster, 1997) . Apparently, the crucial information is covered by the knowledge about the outcome of the previous round.
In the following, we refer to memory one strategies in order to demonstrate the superiority of a new and conceptually different class of strategies. These strategies accumulate knowledge about the history of the game in an internal state which then determines the probability to cooperate in the following round. This approach enables strategies to adjust their strategical behavior to the character of the opponent and to adopt the most promising behavior. For this reason, we call these strategies Adaptors.
Concept of Adaptor
In the context of direct reciprocity, apparently the majority of people does not behave according to the rules prescribed to homo oeconomicus. A series of experiments has significantly contributed to the decline of this rationality concept (see, e.g. Fehr & G. achter, 1998 Fehr & G. achter, , 1999 Henrich et al., 2001; Nowak et al., 2000; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996) and have demonstrated that other factors such as fairness considerations and emotions often play a dominating role in at least human interactions and decision making.
Memory one strategies represent nothing more but simple automata. The outcome of the previous round serves as an input that is translated directly (by means of the rules defining the automaton) into an output, i.e. the subsequent move. But real players engaged in the IPD hardly fit into this simple framework. That is mainly because they process information and eventually develop an intuition and awareness about the character of their opponent.
Our motivation for Adaptor is to go beyond the limitations of memory one strategies towards a more realistic scenario by implementing a simple yet effective information processing scheme, i.e. to provide a framework for suitable learning rules. These rules are based on an internal state which can be viewed as memory and interpreted in terms of emotions.
Mathematically speaking, we consider strategies that trigger their next move on an internal state s t : This internal state summarizes the outcomes of the past rounds with one particular opponent up to time t: The outcome of one round modifies s t according to the following rule:
where D t takes the values dR; dS; dT; dP if round t yields a payoff of R; S; T or P points, respectively. The average number of rounds, i.e. the average length l of an interaction with one particular opponent is specified by the continuation probability w: l ¼ 1=ð1 À wÞ:
The internal state s t specifies the probability to cooperate p c ðs t Þ in the subsequent round. We consider a particularly simple functional shape of p c ðs t Þ where a cooperative region is bounded by defecting ones (see Fig. 1 ):
where Y denotes the Heaviside step-function and p err 51 a small amount of noise, i.e. the probability to misimplement a move. This means that only for s t A½À1; 1 Adaptor most likely cooperates but defects otherwise. Since the interval of s t is not bounded, the chosen width of the cooperative region poses no restriction of generality. Its width relative to the values of dR; dS; dT; and dP determines the strategical characteristics of Adaptor: Actually, this defines ADAPTIVE STRATEGY WINS PRISONER'S DILEMMA the learning rule of Adaptor, i.e. prescribes how to tune subsequent decisions and adapt to an opponent. The concept of Adaptor essentially allows to classify opponents either as dumb or unconditional cooperators, defectors or retaliators. If Adaptor realizes that an opponent can be exploited, the internal state may leave the cooperative regime turning Adaptor into a mean and unforgiving character. Similarly, against defective opponents, Adaptor may quickly adopt a defensive strategy and retaliate with defection. Only in balanced interactions, where erroneous defection is met by retaliation but apologizing handshakes are accepted, cooperation persists. In this sense, cooperative behavior represents a delicate equilibrium between testing the opponents strategy and the ability to correct errors. However, note that this summarizes only the key characteristics of Adaptor's framework. It remains to be seen, to what extend successful learning rules actually take advantage of these possibilities.
Between memory one strategies and the concept of Adaptor a two-fold analogy exists: the outcome of the previous round serves as input and both depend on four parameters. The choice of the cooperation probabilities p R ; p S ; p T ; p P is crucial for the success of memory one strategies, as is the choice of dR; dS; dT; and dP for the success of Adaptor and, in particular, of its error correcting mechanism. In addition, the analogy manifests itself in the fact that Adaptor reproduces many well-known memory one strategies for specific choices of its four parameters.
Also note the conceptual differences to other strategies implementing an internal state like contrite Tit-for-Tat (cTFT) based on the standing of a player (Boerlijst et al., 1997) . cTFT needs to know the internal state of the opponent to find its next decision, whereas the internal state of Adaptor is invisible to the outside world. In that sense, relating the internal state to emotions, cTFT requires additional information on the standing of the opponent while Adaptor's decisions are based solely on its own experiences. Another interesting concept in this context refers to strategies implementing an aspiration level (Posch, 1999; Posch et al., 1999) . The most prominent of these strategies is certainly the aforementioned Pavlov:
Evolving Adaptor
Successful learning rules of Adaptor, i.e. promising sets of parameter values are determined by extensive simulations. We evolve a large and generally heterogeneous population of Adaptors under the influence of selection and mutation over many generations. In each generation, all individuals engage in an IPD with all others. According to the rules of evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) , the payoff achieved by an individual determines its fitness, i.e. its reproductive success. This means that only strategies achieving higher than average fitness will spread in the population and those with lower payoffs are bound to go extinct.
The selection reproduction scheme is governed by the difference equation:
where x t i denotes the frequency of strategy i and f t i its fitness at time t: f t i corresponds to the payoff achieved by strategy i when engaging in the IPD with all strategies present in the population. In the continuous time limit, eqn (5) reduces to the replicator equation (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998) .
For the simulations, we set the cost of cooperation c ¼ 1 and the benefit to b ¼ 3: According to the characteristics of the replicator Fig. 1 . The probability to cooperate p c of Adaptor depends on its internal state s t in round t: s t changes in the course of an IPD interaction [see eqn (3)] and triggers the subsequent move of Adaptor. As long as s t remains in region I, Adaptor most likely cooperates, but defects as soon as s t enters regions II or III. p err indicates a small probability to mis-implement a move.
C. HAUERT AND O. STENULL dynamics, this is equivalent to setting R ¼ 3; S ¼ 0; T ¼ 4 and P ¼ 1: At time t ¼ 0; we start with a homogeneous population of Adaptors with randomly drawn parameters dR; dS; dT; dP: The four parameter values are real numbers from the interval ½À2; 2: The restriction to this interval guarantees that the internal state may not cross from one defective domain to the other (regions II, III in Fig. 1, eqn (3) ) without visiting the cooperative domain at least once (region I in Fig. 1 ). Because p c ðs t Þ is an even function [see eqn (4)], we may restrict either one of the four parameters to ½0; 2 without loss of generality. We exploit this symmetry to reduce the parameter space and choose dTA½0; 2: Finally, all Adaptors start their interactions with an initial value of the internal state s 0 ¼ 0: This choice is motivated by our primary interest in cooperative solutions of the IPD and this makes sure that all Adaptors cooperate at least on their first move.
On average, once in 1000 generations a mutation occurs and a new brand of Adaptor with randomly drawn parameters is introduced. The initial frequency of the mutant is set to f mut ¼ 0:11%: Whenever the frequency of any strategy drops below a certain noise level of f noise ¼ 0:1%; it is removed. This corresponds essentially to considering a population of size 1000: Ten such simulation runs are carried out over 10 8 generations. The results clearly indicate that only strategies with dRE0 are capable of achieving payoffs close to the maximum R: For this reason, we did another ten simulation runs with dR ¼ 0; fixed.
In a second stage, all strategies present at the end of the 20 simulation runs are merged into a new population. The initial frequencies of the strategies are set proportional to their frequencies at the end of the respective simulation run. This population is evolved in absence of mutation according to eqn (5) until only one strategy survives.
This entire procedure is carried out for two different values of the continuation probability w: brief interactions (w ¼ 0:9) with an average length of l ¼ 10 rounds and long interactions (w ¼ 0:999) with l ¼ 1000 rounds. Figure 2 shows the two runs that eventually lead to the most successful set of parameters for Adaptor. The resulting numerical values are summarized in Table 1 .
Note that if we additionally include memory one strategies with randomly drawn p R ; p S ; p T ; p P A½p err ; 1 À p err ; the following results remain Fig. 2 . Evolution of Adaptor's learning rule determined by the four parameter values dT; dR; dP; dS: The runs that eventually lead to the most successful strategical patterns are shown for (a) w ¼ 0:9 and (b) w ¼ 0:999: In both runs, the mean population payoff lies close to the maximum R ¼ 3 indicating highly cooperative strategies. The main difference concerns the parameter dS which is negative for w ¼ 0:9; but positive for w ¼ 0:999: This leads to different strategical behavior and important changes in the error correction mechanisms. ADAPTIVE STRATEGY WINS PRISONER'S DILEMMA unchanged. Generally, Adaptors with the same strategical characteristics emerge. Only in few cases and only for w ¼ 0:999 Pavlov-like strategies were found. But this is due to the finite simulation time, in Section 4 we actually show that Adaptor is able to outperform Pavlov:
Interestingly, significantly different strategical patterns evolve for brief and long-lasting interactions. This difference essentially results from dS and dT having opposite signs for w ¼ 0:9; but are both positive for w ¼ 0:999:
BRIEF INTERACTIONS
In brief interactions w ¼ 0:9 the learning rule of Adaptor exploits all the features provided by the framework: exploitation of cooperators, retaliation against defectors and cooperation against retaliators and kin. Against defective opponents like all D; the internal state takes its values primarily in region II and hence Adaptor acts not cooperatively. Similarly, Adaptor tends to defect against unconditional cooperators like all C because its internal state primarily lies in sector III. Typical payoff values against prominent memory one strategies are gathered in Table 2 . Another important feature of Adaptor is its error correcting capability when playing against kin. A typical sequence of moves following an error is depicted in Table 3 . The number of defective moves played to correct an error is minimal. Compared to Pavlov 0 s error correction scheme Adaptor plays no round of mutual defection. This is in favor of Adaptor's score against itself. At the same time Adaptor gets hardly exploited by all D; but is also less ready to exploit all C: It has to be mentioned, however, that Adaptor's error correction scheme cannot prevent conflicts from escalating if an unfortunate sequence of fast following erroneous moves occurs.
In order to investigate the robustness of this concept, we consider variations of two external parameters: the continuation probability w and the temptation to defect T: Figure 3(a) shows the payoff of several strategies as a function of w: Most importantly this demonstrates that (a) all D always scores significantly less against Adaptor than against Pavlov and (b) for long interactions (l4500) Adaptor's payoff decreases when playing against its kin. This is a consequence of the small probability of escalations resulting in deadlocks of mutual defection. Figure 4 (a) similarly shows the payoff of the same strategies as a function of T: Adaptor and Pavlov do almost equally well: both perform n The entries indicate the payoffs achieved by the strategy listed in the first column against the row strategy. The lowercase c and d in front indicates the initial move. The probability of mis-implementing moves is set to p err ¼ 0:01; i.e. the strategy quadruple for e.g. all C is ð0:99; 0:99; 0:99; 0:99Þ: Table 3 Error correcting pattern of Adaptor against kin for w ¼ 0:9
$ After playing an erroneous D, marked by an asterisk, the mistaken Adaptor offers a handshake by switching to C and accepts punishment for the erroneous move. The number of D's played is minimal, so that the loss during the error correction procedure is minimized. Once the error is corrected, the internal states are equal and almost unchanged. For short interaction lengths, it is therefore highly unlikely that another type of error correction scheme would be ever observed.
C. HAUERT AND O. STENULL slightly better when playing against kin than against the other strategy. However, Adaptor scores roughly twice as much against all D: This is also reflected in the score of all D against the two strategies: while the score against Adaptor increases very slowly with T; it increases significantly faster against Pavlov: It is the score of all D against Pavlov that delimits the parameter range where Pavlov is a limit ESS [see Section 4 and eqn (6)].
LONG INTERACTIONS
In long-lasting interactions w ¼ 0:999; the efficient exploitation of unconditional cooperators as well as the relentless retaliation against defectors become apparently far less relevant compared to the enhanced importance of error correcting abilities. The most successful learning rule basically prevents the internal state from entering region II because dS and dT have the same sign. The resulting strategical patterns are closely related to Pavlov: This is not too surprising because Pavlov implements probably the most robust error correction mechanism. Typical payoff values are compiled in Table 4 and the relevant error correction scheme of Adaptor is illustrated in Table 5 . The first error is corrected identical to Pavlov; i.e. a single round of mutual defection is required to overcome the error. From then on, Adaptor plays two successive rounds of mutual defection before returning to cooperation (Lindgren, 1991) . Occasionally, a more complicated sequence of moves may occur before cooperation is re-established. Unlike for brief interactions, the risk of escalations is almost negligible since it requires synchronized occurrences of erroneous moves.
The robustness of Adaptor is again investigated by varying w and T: Figure 3(b) shows that Adaptor's payoff remains essentially unaffected by the interaction length. At the same time, the score of Pavlov against Adaptor crucially depends on w: For w ¼ 0:999; its payoff is almost as low as against all D: As for w ¼ 0:9; all D scores less against Adaptor than against Pavlov:
Effects of variations of T are shown in Fig. 4(b) . Adaptor's performance against kin is almost independent of T and remains close to the maximum R: The payoffs of Pavlov and all D against kin and each other are largely equal for brief and long interactions. Significant differences occur only in the payoffs of Adaptor against Pavlov and all D and vice versa. Adaptor is able to exploit Pavlov while Pavlov earns little more than against all D: Compared to w ¼ 0:9; Adaptor does less well against all D; but the latter scores still significantly less against Adaptor than against Pavlov:
Important distinctions between Adaptor and Pavlov concern the formers ability to reduce its Table 4 Payoff for several important strategies in the simultaneous IPD with w ¼ 0:999 [c.f. Fig. 3(b) ].
The entries are defined as in Table 5 Typical error correcting mechanism of Adaptor against its own kin for w ¼ 0:999
$ The erroneous move is marked by an asterisk. The first error is corrected according to the well-known scheme of Pavlov (not shown). From then on, errors are followed by two rounds of mutual defection. Occasionally, errors are corrected involving more complicated sequences of moves requiring as much as seven rounds (not shown) loss against all DFnote that this results from the second round of mutual defection in the error correcting scheme of Adaptor. At the same time Adaptor exploits all C more effectively. Even after an erroneous D of all C; Adaptor does not return to cooperation.
Adaptor vs. Memory one Strategies
To analyse Adaptor's performance in depth, we carry out evolutionary tournaments in which Adaptor competes with memory one strategies. One might argue that such a comparison is unfair because Adaptor has a higher memory capacity than memory one strategies. Adaptor is capable of storing a real number, whereas memory one strategies are storing merely an integer variable which takes on the values R; S; T or P: However, we think that such a comparison is valuable for two reasons. First, memory one strategies have gained most interest in the past and are best studied. Second, generalizing the concept of memory one strategies to include longer memory sizes apparently does not lead to substantial changes in behavior and performance compared to Pavlov (Hauert & Schuster, 1997) . Among the memory one strategies, we restrict ourselves to those which may be specified by ð p R ; p S ; p T ; p P Þ with p i AS ¼ fp err ; 1=3; 2=3; 1 À p err g; iAfR; S; T; Pg and initial moves of C or D: Note that most of the strategies well established in literature are covered by this choice.
For our parameter values Pavlov is a limit ESS (Leimar, 1997) for a sufficiently high continuation probability w: (Nowak & Sigmund, 1995) . However, note that Pavlov is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Lorberbaum, 1994) because strategies doing equally well could invade and possibly undermine the resident population through random drift. Evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith, 1982) , however, requires that no mutant strategy introduced with an arbitrary small frequency is able to invade the resident population.
Our tournaments are based on the usual selection dynamics [see eqn (5)] augmented by mutation. Mutations occur on average every 1000 generations. However, instead of introducing mutants at a fixed initial frequency f mut ; we proceed in analogy to the optimization technique of simulated annealing: the initial frequency # f mut ðtÞ assigned to mutants decreases with time t:
where t max specifies the total number of generations. Thus, early mutants are introduced with frequencies close to 1=2 while late mutants occur with frequencies close to the noise level f noise ¼ 0:1%: If the frequency of any strategy drops below this fixed noise level, it is removed. New strategies are drawn with equal probabilities out of a set consisting of Adaptor and memory one strategies with p i AS: Since we consider only a finite number of strategies, each strategy is selected on average roughly 20 times (t max ¼ 10 7 ) at different frequencies of the mutant. Note that this estimation distinguishes between strategies playing C or D on their first move.
At time t ¼ 0; we start with a homogeneous population playing a completely random strategy ð0:5; 0:5; 0:5; 0:5Þ: We perform these simulations for both w ¼ 0:9 and 0:999: Typical simulation runs are depicted in Fig. 5 . In all our simulations, we observed similar patterns where Adaptor takes over the population after some stage of equilibration. When introduced with high frequency mutants can invade the population until Adaptor takes over again. This interplay manifests itself in a sequence of meta-stable states. With decreasing # f mut ðtÞ; the population of Adaptors becomes noteworthy stable. For w ¼ 0:9; all invasion attempts fail for # f mut ðtÞt44%: The same holds for w ¼ 0:999 with # f mut ðtÞt38%: In both cases, the average payoff in homogeneous populations of Adaptors is close to the maximum value R; i.e. cooperative behavior dominates. The principle finding of our simulations is that Adaptor is capable of invading a population playing Pavlov whereas Adaptor is immune to invasions, in particular by Pavlov:
Conclusions
The concept of Adaptor was motivated by experimental findings documenting the importance of emotions rather than rational reasoning in at least human decision making. The concept of the Adaptor strategy provides a powerful framework for learning rules attempting to model this process. Adaptor is determined by four parameters dR; dS; dT and dP defining the learning rule together with an internal state summarizing the course of the game. This internal state triggers Adaptor's subsequent moves and enables the strategy to adjust its decisions to the opponent and to adapt the most promising strategical behavior.
Through evolutionary simulations, we determine successful learning rules for brief and longlasting interactions. In both cases, Adaptor turns out to be highly cooperative when playing against kin, implementing an efficient error correcting mechanism. However, as in real situations, it cannot prevent conflicts from escalating if unfortunate sequences of fast following erroneous moves occur.
The results clearly show that cooperative behavior strongly correlates with dRE0; i.e. the internal state remains unchanged after obtaining R points. This seems reasonable because it prevents the internal state from leaving the cooperative regime without cause. The other three parameters determine Adaptor's error correcting scheme as well as its behavior when competing against other strategies. The resulting strategical patterns depend on the characteristic interaction length as determined by the continuation probability w: For brief interactions (w ¼ 0:9), dS and dT have opposite signs. This enables Adaptor to distinguish between unconditional cooperators, defectors and retaliators reflected by the three regimes of the internal state. The strategical patterns suggest an interpretation in emotional terms as satisfied, frustrated and ruthless. Dumb cooperators are remorselessly exploited while defectors face tough retaliation. Cooperative behavior then resembles a tightrope walk between testing the opponents strategy and the ability to readily correct erroneous moves and re-establish cooperation.
The importance of efficient and reliable error correcting mechanisms is far more pronounced in long-lasting interactions (w ¼ 0:999). This is reflected in dS and dT having the same signs which leads to strategical patterns closely related to Pavlov: Consequentially, only two out of the three regimes of the internal state essentially determine Adaptor's behavior. This blurs the above distinction between ruthlessness and frustration. In that case, even against defectors, Adaptor occasionally offers a cooperative handshake hoping to re-establish cooperation.
The performance of Adaptor is surprisingly robust to environmental changes, i.e. variations of external parameters. Because of its parametrization, Adaptor is immune to changes of the payoff values R; S; T and P: Basically, this also holds for its performance against memory one strategies. With respect to changes in the average length of an interaction, the score of Adaptor against kin remains largely unaffected. However, for interaction lengths that considerably exceed the settings when evolving the learning rule, escalations leading to deadlocks in states of mutual defection become important.
Of particular interest was Adaptor's performance against memory one strategies well established in the literature. In another set of evolutionary simulations Adaptor competes against memory one strategies in a population where mutants are introduced with decreasing frequency. The main results of these simulations show: (a) Adaptor is superior in performance to memory one strategies. In particular, it outperforms Pavlov known as a most successful strategy in the IPD: One major reason for this is certainly its better ability to resist exploitation by all D: In long interactions, Adaptor resembles Pavlov but after an erroneous defection it resumes cooperation only after two consecutive rounds of mutual defection (see also Lindgren,1991) . (b) Adaptor displays a remarkable robustness, i.e. it is not only stable with respect to arbitrary small perturbations as requested by evolutionary stability, but also to mutants introduced with frequencies as high as roughly 40%: This makes Adaptor a stable cooperative strategy even in tiny populations or groups of as few as three individuals.
